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Abstract. Non-epileptic attack disorder (NEAD) is one of the most important differential diagnoses of epilepsy. Impairment of
consciousness is the key feature of non-epileptic attacks (NEAs). The first half of this review summarises the clinical research
literature featuring observations relating to consciousness in NEAD. The second half places this evidence in the wider context
of the recent discourse on consciousness in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind. We argue that studies of consciousness
should not only distinguish between the ‘level’ and ‘content’ of consciousness but also between ‘phenomenal consciousness’
(consciousness of states it somehow “feels to be like”) and ‘access consciousness’ (having certain ‘higher’ cognitive processes
at one’s disposal). The existing evidence shows that there is a great intra- and interindividual variability of NEA experience.
However, in most NEAs phenomenal experience – and, as a precondition for that experience, vigilance or wakefulness – is
reduced to a lesser degree than in those epileptic seizures involving impairment of consciousness. In fact, complete loss of
“consciousness” is the exception rather than the rule in NEAs. Patients, as well as external observers, may have a tendency to
overestimate impairments of consciousness during the seizures.
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1. Introduction
Non-Epileptic Attack Disorder (NEAD) is one of the
most important differential diagnoses of epilepsy. A
recent study, which reportedly captured all patients with
a blackout first presenting to a neurologist, emergency
room or primary care physician, suggested that 57.4%
had epilepsy, 22.3% had fainted and 18.0% had had
non-epileptic attacks [40].
Non-epileptic attacks (NEAs) superficially resemble
epileptic seizures, but are not associated with ictal elec-
trical discharges in the brain [49]. NEAs can be de-
fined positively as episodes of paroxysmal impairment
of self-control associated with a range of motor, sen-
sory and mental manifestations, and representing an
experiential or behavioral response to distress caused
by internal or external stimuli. The overwhelming ma-
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jority of NEAs are considered manifestations of dis-
sociative or conversion disorders in the current diag-
nostic manuals [2,80]. Previous review articles have
described the diagnostic approach to NEAD [22,58],
the clinical picture [56], aetiology [57], and treatment
of NEAD [45,46,59]. Here we focus on impairment of
consciousness, the most prominent clinical feature of
the condition.
The term ‘consciousness’ is difficult to define be-
cause it has different meanings depending on the con-
text in which it is used. The use of ‘consciousness’
in everyday discourse differs from how the term is ap-
plied in psychology, cognitive neuroscience, or the phi-
losophy of mind. In neuroscience, where the term is
used much more reluctantly than often assumed, it is
generally accepted that consciousness, like other men-
tal phenomena, is dependent on brain functions. Since
the scope of neuroscience is limited to insights into the
physical realm, the more general question of how this
‘dependence’ is characterised has traditionally been left
to the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers favor the
weakly materialistic hypothesis that conscious states
are supervenient on cerebral states. Supervenience as
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an asymmetrical dependence relation holds that there
can be no change in mental (or, specifically, conscious)
states unless there is also a change in cerebral states.
Neuroscientific research has to confine itself to the
identification of the “neural correlate of consciousness”
(NCC) [23]. The NCC is defined by mapping states of
a neural system to states of consciousness, where the
respective state of the neural system is sufficient for
the corresponding state of consciousness [21]. Neu-
ropsychological and physiological studies suggest that
the NCC is neither a property of the brain as a whole
nor a function of a single consciousness ‘centre’ [24].
Rather, the NCC is established by the interaction and
temporal coordination of a wide range of neural sub-
systems of the human brain (including but not limited
to those underpinning sensation, attention, voluntary
movement and memory).
But how is ‘consciousness’ used in clinical neu-
rology? The 1981 classification of the International
League Against Epilepsy (ILAE) links consciousness
to the patients’ degree of awareness and/or respon-
siveness. While responsiveness is understood as the
ability to carry out simple commands or willed move-
ments (intention and perception), awareness is defined
as the patients’ contact with the event and its recall
(memory) [26]. Recently, an alternative model of con-
sciousness has been proposed in epileptology. This
model [18] is based on the observation that the lev-
el of general awareness and the “subjective contents”
of consciousness are supported by different neurobio-
logical systems. Whereas the level of consciousness
depends on the functional state of ascending ponto-
mesodiencephalic reticular pathways and widespread
thalamo-cortical projections, subjective experiences in-
volve the temporo-limbic modulation of a range of cor-
tical activations [16,18,51]. In keeping with this bi-
dimensional interpretation, this model distinguishes be-
tween ‘quantitative’ features (the level of conscious-
ness) and ‘qualitative’ aspects (the content of con-
sciousness). The level of consciousness ranges from
alertness to coma, and is reflected by the patient’s re-
sponsiveness. The content comprises of the patient’s
subjective experiences during the seizure. The self-
report Ictal Consciousness Inventory (ICI) is a quanti-
tative measure based on this model [19].
To date, only a small number of studies have focused
directly on the topic of consciousness in NEAD. How-
ever, a number of studies have touched on aspects of
consciousness in this disorder. The first half of this
article will summarise this literature. The second half
will place this evidence in the wider context of the re-
cent discourse on consciousness in neuroscience and
the philosophy of mind.
2. Clinical studies
2.1. Ictal consciousness
NEAD is diagnosed most commonly in patients
whose attacks involve impairment of consciousne-
ss [56]. However, the diagnosis has also been applied
to purely motor, sensory or experiential attacks akin to
(epileptic) simple partial seizures [49]. Studies using
cluster analysis suggest that several types of NEAs can
be differentiated on the basis of visible seizure mani-
festations [3,34]. The commonest semiology involves
excessive movement of limbs, trunk and head. Seizures
with stiffening and tremor, or seizures with atonia are
less frequent in most series [56]. Impairment of con-
sciousness occurs in all three seizure-types.
Whilst patients with NEAD are more likely to stress
in interaction with the doctor than patients with epilep-
sy that they are “completely out” in their seizures and
are more likely to deny any subjective seizure expe-
rience [61,64], a number of studies suggests that ic-
tal impairment of consciousness is typically less pro-
found in NEAD than in (complex partial or generalised)
epileptic seizures. Purposeful movements or signs of
reactivity may be observed whilst patients appear un-
conscious [35,50]. Eye opening may be resisted [30,
35,48]. The pupillary light response is preserved [63].
Cyanosis is unusual in NEAs [38]. A study in which 66
patients with epilepsy and 29 patients with NEAD com-
pleted one Ictal Consciousness Inventory (ICI) for a to-
tal of 167 seizures showed that, at the group level, pa-
tients with NEAD reported a higher ‘level’ of ictal con-
sciousness (ICI-L, p = 0.01)) and a greater variety of
experiential ‘content’ (ICI-C, p = 0.01). The findings
were the same when patients with NEAD were com-
pared with the subgroups with temporal lobe seizures
(n = 52) or idiopathic generalised epilepsy (n = 47).
However, there were no significant differences between
patients with NEAD and frontal lobe seizures (n =
14) [17].
In keeping with these findings based on self-report,
a study in which patients with seizure-related impair-
ment of consciousness underwent an ictal assessment
procedure showed that 48% of patients with NEAs but
only 18% of patients with complex partial seizures were
able to follow simple commands [5]. Typically, NEAs
impaired recall of ictal experiences to a lesser extent
than epileptic seizures. The study cited above showed
that 63% of patients who had just experienced a NEA
but only 4% of patients who had had a complex partial
seizure could recall at least two memory items of a neu-
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Fig. 1. Percentages of 58 consecutive patients with NEAD self-reporting ‘awareness’ and ‘responsiveness’ during their seizures.
ropsychological testing procedure [5]. Unfortunately,
the methodology did not allow the authors of the stud-
ies to determine whether the ictal memory problems
described by a substantial minority of patients with
NEAD and the majority of patients with epilepsy were
due to ictal problems with storage of information or to
difficulties with post-ictal retrieval. A study in which
patients with NEAD or epilepsy were encouraged to
recollect details of events which took part during their
seizures under hypnosis, suggests that the ictal memory
deficits associated with NEAs were at least partly due
to the latter: in the NEAD (but not the epilepsy) group,
recall for ictal events improved significantly with hyp-
nosis. The hypnotic recall procedure had a sensitivity
of 100% and specificity of 85% in the differentiation
of NEAD and epileptics seizures [44].
We have carried out two studies based on patients’
self-report of their impairment of consciousness in
NEAD. The first was a retrospective analysis of de-
tailed records of seizure descriptions recorded by a sin-
gle psychotherapist and provided by 58 consecutive pa-
tients seen in our psychotherapy program. This study
revealed that the largest subgroup of patients said that
they were neither ‘aware’ (able to recall all of their
seizure experience) nor ‘responsive’ (able to respond
at least partially with or without being able to recollect
this later) in at least one part of their seizures. Howev-
er, many other patients reported that they remained at
least partially ‘aware’ or ‘responsive’ throughout their
seizures. Five per cent had more than one seizure type
and were included in different categories (Fig. 1, un-
published data).
The second study was based on the analysis of
100 responses from patients with video-EEG proven
NEAD to the 98-item Paroxysmal Event Profile (PEP)
questionnaire. The profile asks respondents to rate
statements such as “My attacks often come on when
I am asleep” on a five-point Likert scale (“always”,
“frequently”, “sometimes”, “rarely”, “never”). The
PEP questionnaire combines questions from a range
of sources. It lists symptoms of panic disorder, dere-
alisation, depersonalisation (PTSD) from the ICD-10,
DSM-IV and Present State Examination, the symptoms
of dissociation captured by the Dissociative Experi-
ence Scale Taxon, DES-T [76,77], questions previously
found to distinguish between generalised tonic clonic
seizures and syncope [36,66], or thought to differenti-
ate between epilepsy and NEAD [73]. A ‘dissociation’
score was based on the eight items included in the DES-
T. An ‘anxiety’ score including physical and mental
manifestations and comprised of 14 items. 86 of the
patients also provided responses to the 34-item Parox-
ysmal Event Observer (PEO) questionnaire completed
by someone who had witnessed their attacks [62]. Ta-
ble 1a shows patients’ answers to questions relating to
impairment of consciousness. Table 1b shows relevant
responses on the PEO questionnaire.
Firstly, the results of this study reflect the hetero-
geneity of the disorder. Individual patients typically
experience a range of seizure severities or symptoms.
The “never” and “always” options only made up a mi-
nority of responses. Secondly, the findings are con-
sistent with the idea that over one half of NEAs do
not involve complete loss of awareness and reactivity.
The results of the PEO questionnaire raise the possi-
bility that witnesses underestimate patients’ awareness
during their seizures.
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Table 1
Respondents replies to some of the items relating to impairment of ictal awareness on the PEP (Table 1a) and PEO questionnaires
(Table 1b)
Table 1a
Item Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never
During my attacks I can see or hear people around me 22% 17% 26% 9% 26%
During my attacks I have no idea what is happening around me 30% 25% 26% 5% 14%
In my attacks I am conscious but I can’t react to things 28% 20% 28% 1% 23%
In my attacks I drift in and out of consciousness 28% 33% 17% 4% 18%
I am aware of shaking uncontrollably in the attacks 16% 11% 33% 4% 36%
Afterwards I have no idea I’ve had an attack 11% 12% 25% 18% 34%
After my attack I find myself somewhere and I don’t know how I’ve got there 8% 6% 19% 10% 57%
Table 1b
Item Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never
The attacks involve loss of awareness or the ability to react to things 63% 12% 13% 1% 10%
The attacks involve a complete loss of consciousness or blackout 56% 19% 8% 5% 12%
Fig. 2. Preference of metaphoric conceptualisations by patients with epilepsy or NEAD (from [53]).
Our study showed that there was a positive corre-
lation between the summary dissociation and anxiety
scores (r = 0.514, p < 0.001, see Fig. 3) [62].
2.2. Subjective seizure experience
Many patients describe physical symptoms of pan-
ic or hyperventilation during their seizures, often with
few mental symptoms or little cognitive awareness of
anxiety [31,70,75,79]. Indeed, NEAs have been inter-
preted by some as a dissociative response to physical
arousal, or as panic attacks without panic [31]. Fig-
ure 3 suggests that this interpretation may be appro-
priate, however, only for one group of patients with
NEAD. In other patients impairment of consciousness
seems to occur in the absence of symptoms of dissoci-
ation or anxiety/arousal. Even in the absence of panic
symptoms, most patients experience their seizures as
confusing and beyond their control [32,74].
Inspired by a German study [73], we used a cognitive
linguistic technique to gain a better understanding what
it is like to experience a NEA [53]. Having identified all
seizure metaphors used by 21 patients (13 with NEAD,
8 with epilepsy) in transcripts of 30-minute encounters
with a neurologist, a linguist blinded to the patients’
diagnosis categorised the metaphors into different con-
ceptualisations. 80.8% of 382 metaphors conceptu-
alised seizures as an agent/force, event/situation or
space/place (see Table 2). Most patients used metaphors
from all categories, but the profile of metaphor choice
differed significantly between the epilepsy and NEAD
groups (Fig. 2). Patients with epilepsy preferred meta-
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phors depicting the seizure as an agent/force or event
/situation. In contrast, patients with NEAD more often
used metaphors of space/place. Logistic regression
analyses correctly predicted the diagnosis of NEAD or
epilepsy in 85.7% of cases.
This observation is in keeping with another study fo-
cusing on the use of the medical labels which found that
patients with NEAD were more likely than those with
epilepsy to resist terms such as “seizure” or “attack”
which imply that ictal symptoms are the consequence
of an external agent acting on the patients’ body [54].
It also fits with the findings of a study in which 48 pa-
tients with video-EEG proven epilepsy or NEAD were
contacted after a major earthquake: 23% of patients
with epilepsy but none with NEAD volunteered that
they thought that they were going into a seizure when
they first became aware of the earthquake [78].
2.3. Interictal observations
A discussion of consciousness in relation to NEAD
would not be complete without reference to interictal
observations [57]. The curious combination of a history
of trauma or conflict and the missing awareness of its
pathogenic relevance for apparently physical symptoms
is one of the observations which first gave rise to the
concept of conversion disorder [28,29].
More recently, several studies have confirmed that
many patients with NEAD have experienced significant
trauma in their lives [13,27,60]. A sizable subgroup has
suffered abuse or neglect in childhood [1,11,65]. The
onset of seizures is often precipitated by negative life
events [14]. However, whilst patients with NEAD more
commonly report negative life events in the year prior
to the onset of their seizures [8], they are more likely
to deny life stresses and less likely than patients with
newly developed epilepsy to attribute their seizures to
‘psychological’ causes [72]. In some cases the miss-
ing ‘conscious’ link between a life event or traumatic
experience may be related to the fact that the event is
related to an ‘unspeakable’ dilemma [33]. The finding
that over 90% of patients with NEAD score in the alex-
ithymic range on the Toronto Alexithymia scale offers
an alternative explanation for this finding [7]. Adverse
early experience may cause deficits of emotion per-
ception and processing which make patients less ‘con-
scious’ of their emotional state in adult life and there-
fore less likely to accept that emotional distress could
trigger physical symptoms [7,39].
Two experimental studies provide some first insights
into the neurobiological underpinnings of these clinical
observations. Both suggest that there are abnormalities
of interictal preconscious cognitive processing in pa-
tients with NEAD (perhaps related to a history of previ-
ous trauma). The first measured the eye blink response
to startle with or without a weak to moderate stimulus
presented briefly before the startle-eliciting stimulus.
Patients with NEAD showed impairment of the startle
inhibition normally seen after a pre-pulse stimulus [55].
The other study used a masked emotional Stroop test
in which colour naming latencies were measured after
study participants had been shown neutral, angry or
happy faces for 30ms (i.e. not for long enough to enter
conscious awareness). Compared to healthy controls,
patients with NEAD showed a positive attentional bias
to angry faces [4].
3. Discussion
3.1. Nosology
In NEAs, consciousness is thought to be impaired
through unknown mechanisms that have been described
as processes of dissociation [12]. The DSM-IV defines
dissocation as a “disruption of the usually integrated
functions of consciousness, memory, identity or per-
ception of the environment” [2]. The concept of dis-
sociation relies on the assumption that the mentioned
functions somehow exist as separable modules or en-
tities, which are held together in a well-functioning
cognitive system, but which can fall apart under cer-
tain pathological conditions. Although the DSM-IV
and ICD-10 exclude physical causes before a disso-
ciative disorder can be diagnosed, it is implausible
that NEAs are characterized by a complete absence of
pathological cerebral processes. Quite the contrary: if
mental states are asymmetrically dependent on brain
states, then some pathological cerebral process must
occur, namely there must be a NC of the mental alter-
ations, subjective symptoms and behavioral manifesta-
tions that characterise NEAs.
The Standardized Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
Dissociative Disorders identifies five different compo-
nents of dissociative disorders: depersonalization, de-
realisation, amnesia, identity confusion and identity al-
teration [71]. The DSM-IV explains that dissociation
is not necessarily pathological. In keeping with this no-
tion, the Dissociative Experience Scale (DES), the most
widely used measure of dissociation, was conceived as
an instrument to capture the full spectrum of dissocia-
tive experience ranging from ‘normal’ experiences such
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Table 2
Metaphoric conceptualisation of seizures (from [53])
Category Seizure as an agent/force Seizure as an event/situa-
tion
Seizure as a space/place Other
Grammatical subject Seizure Seizure Patient Variable
Semantic agency With the seizure Variable With the patient Variable
Examples seizures come, go, come in,
come on, come up, creep up
on you, get you, try to do
things, set off, are sent in,
are straight there, are fought,
counteracted, contained, are
let pass, wear off
seizures happen, occur,
take place, are due, start,
finish, go on, carry on,
develop, are experienced,
witnessed, handled, con-
trolled, stopped, avoided/
put off, are brought on,
run their course
drifting off, being off some-
where else, going, going off,
being gone, coming back,
coming round, coming to, go-
ing down, being down, not
being there, being out in-
to seizures, in seizures, out
of seizures, within seizures,
through seizures
seizures are started up,
are fixed, like an electri-
cal charge, like the lights
are on but nobody’s at
home, like something go-
ing off, like shutting a
computer off, like cold or
hot water on the top of
your head, are as if your
head carries on without
you
Fig. 3. Positive correlation of the number of ictal symptoms of anxiety and dissociation reported by 100 patients with NEAs (r = 0.514, p <
0.001).
as absorption at one end to pathological states (such as
having multiple identities) on the other [6]. However,
subsequent studies in clinical and non-clinical popula-
tions have suggested that ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’
dissocation may be qualitatively different. The DES-
Taxon (based on a subset of eight questions about more
abnormal manifestations of depersonalisation, dereali-
sation and amnesia from the DES) has been proposed
as a more specific measure of pathological dissocia-
tion [77].
More recently, an alternative subdivision of disso-
ciative symptoms has been proposed: based on neuro-
biological arguments, manifestations of ‘detachment’
have been separated from those of ‘compartmentalisa-
tion’ [37]. Dissociative ‘detachment’ has been thought
to encompass depersonalization, derealisation and sim-
ilar phenomena such as out-of-body experiences (i.e.
phenomena associated with abnormal distancing of self
and environment). The concept of ‘detachment’ over-
laps with manifestations of peri-traumatic dissocia-
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tion (when individuals dissociate during or immedi-
ately after a traumatic event). ‘Compartmentalisation’
refers to dissociative amnesia and other neurological-
ly unexplained symptoms including paralysis, sensory
loss, gait disturbance, aphonia or pseudo-hallucinations
(for instance the disintegration functions such as vi-
sion/attention/object naming in a patients with dissocia-
tive visual loss). In this hypothesised bipartite model of
dissociation, NEAD have been attributed to compart-
mentalisation [37]. Compartmentalisation phenomena
are thought to relate to deficits in the integration of
neural systems normally amenable to deliberate con-
trol [15], whereas detachment experiences are inter-
preted as a result of the top-down (frontal) inhibition of
limbic emotional systems, accompanied by activation
of the right prefrontal cortex [67]. A number of stud-
ies provide evidence for an inhibitory mechanism of
detachment in the context of high emotion and arousal
in patients with persistent depersonalisation. A neu-
roimaging study in which patients were compared with
healthy controls showed reduced activation in brain ar-
eas associated with emotional experience and increased
activation in regions associated with emotional regula-
tion [52]. In a study based on the measurement of skin
conductance, patients showed increased response laten-
cy to unpleasant stimuli compared to healthy controls
and patients with anxiety disorders [68]. There was a
steady decline in noradrenaline levels with increasing
symptoms of depersonalisation in patients with deper-
sonalisation disorder [69].
The notions that ‘dissociation’ can be subdivided in-
to ‘detachment’ and ‘compartmentalisation’ and that
NEAs are associated with the latter have been tested.
Patients with NEAD scored more highly on a measure
of ‘compartmentalisation’ than a measure of ‘detach-
ment’ when compared to epilepsy controls. However,
this difference was no longer significant when anxiety
and depression were controlled for [47]. The lack of
positive findings in this study does not mean that im-
pairment of consciousness in NEAD is not related to
the hypothesised processes of dissociation as outlined
above. Patients with epilepsy experience dissociative
symptoms for different reasons and may not have been
a suitable control group.
There are many reasons why this and other studies
using self-report tools of dissociation in patients with
NEAD have not produced clearer results. These in-
clude the difficulties with the concepts of ‘normal’ and
‘pathological’ dissocation, ‘detachment’ and ‘compart-
mentalisation’ and the measurement of these experi-
ences. Another important clinical reason is the hetero-
genity of NEA disorders. The correlation between anx-
iety symptoms and symptoms of dissociation demon-
strated above indicates that there are some NEAD pa-
tients with high levels of anxiety and with frequent and
numerous dissociative symptoms and others with few
or no manifestations of anxiety or dissociation. This
raises the possibility that NEA-related impairments of
consciousness occur for different reasons.
In some patients NEAs are likely to occur at times
of high anxiety. Patients in this subgroup may experi-
ence their seizures as a re-traumatisation and may de-
rive symptomatic benefit from ictal detachment under-
pinned by the inhibition of limbic emotional systems.
In these patients postictal amnesia may not (only) be
explained by ‘compartmentalisation’ (inaccessibility of
memories which were laid down during the seizure) but
by the fact that ictal memories were not secured in the
first place or laid down in a fragmented fashion (akin to
peritraumatic memories). Other patients with NEAD
may have a very low tolerance of emotional fluctuation
and may readily ‘compartmentalise’ without ever be-
coming aware of anxiety or other unpleasant symptoms
of emotional distress.
3.2. Philosophical contributions
The issue of consciousness in NEAD raises a num-
ber of conceptual and methodical problems. As stated
above, consciousness is not a single entity, but rather
a complex of heterogeneous phenomena like wakeful-
ness, awareness, the capacity for integrated behavior,
conscious cognitive capacities like perception, thought,
and memory, self-reflection, and others. In the philoso-
phy of mind, it is common to distinguish, in variable ter-
minologies, nonconceptual from conceptual conscious
episodes (see [42] for a summary). Best known is
Block’s (1995) distinction between ‘phenomenal’ con-
sciousness and ‘access’ consciousness [9]. A state is
nonconceptually, phenomenally conscious if it has “ex-
periential properties”, that is, if there is something “it
is like to be” in that state for the respective organism.
It somehow “feels to be” in a certain phenomenally
conscious state if, for example, we experience pain or
if we sense an object as having a certain colour. A
state is access-conscious, on the other hand, insofar as
it is relevant for reasoning and/or the control of ac-
tion of the organism qua content of the respective state
(Block 1995). Thoughts and beliefs, which are essen-
tially characterised by their content, are paradigmat-
ic for access-consciousness. To be access-conscious
largely means to have certain ‘higher’ cognitive pro-
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cesses at one’s disposal, while to be phenomenally con-
scious means to experience a certain phenomenal qual-
ity. This philosophical distinction between conceptual
and nonconceptual consciousness differs from the Ca-
vanna and Monaco model of consciousness mentioned
above [18]. In that model, the distinction between
conceptual and nonconceptual consciousness is largely
lost, as the term “subjective content” illustrates, while
a “quantitative” aspect of consciousness is introduced
in terms of wakefulness, general awareness, or vigi-
lance. These “quantitative” aspects, on the other hand,
are somehow implicitly presupposed in Block’s model,
which does, of course, primarily consider the awake,
healthy person, not a person who is asleep, or in a co-
ma. Vigilance and awareness are aspects of conscious-
ness that belong to a more basic level of functioning,
at least when phenomenal consciousness is concerned:
we can assume that to have phenomenally conscious
states, a certain level of awareness and wakefulness is
required as a necessary (but not sufficient) precondi-
tion. For access-consciousness, the question of how
much ‘quantitative’ consciousness is required to oper-
ate on an access-conscious level is an intricate issue,
since at least a major part of complex, integrated behav-
ior can be performed unconsciously. On the other hand,
we would probably not be tempted to speak of rational
action or meaningful speech (except in a psychoanalyt-
ical sense!) in a person who is not awake. Anyway –
for a discussion of consciousness in NEAs, it would
be desirable to differentiate the quantitative aspects of
consciousness from the features of phenomenal and/or
access-consciousness, as far as possible. Whereas Ca-
vanna and Monaco apply the terminology of the ‘sub-
jective’ and the ‘qualitative’ also to features of access-
consciousness, for the philosopher, these terms remain
reserved for the characterization of phenomenal con-
sciousness.
3.3. Assessment of consciousness
Aside of the problem of the definition of conscious-
ness, there is the issue of how to empirically assess
conscious phenomena, or how to empirically verify or
prove the presence of consciousness. The immediate
and direct detection of conscious phenomena is neither
possible in clinical settings nor in neuroscientific exper-
iments, because these phenomena are always and only
accessed via intermediate overt behavioral or physio-
logical markers: verbal reports, button presses, event-
related potentials, EEG patterns, BOLD responses, and
the like. Due to the essentially private and/or subjec-
tive character of conscious states, it seems methodolog-
ically impossible to detect or observe conscious states
of other beings directly from a third-person perspec-
tive. Actual neuroscientific approaches to conscious-
ness never rest upon direct correlations between neu-
ronal and conscious states, because the reference to
conscious states is always mediated by the overt mark-
ers listed above. The degree of external inaccessibility
seems to be higher for the phenomenal features of con-
scious states than for access-conscious states or basic
‘quantitative’ features like vigilance, because the latter,
but not the former can be operationalised as content-
sensitive or stimulus-related cognitive operations that
are, at least in principle, objectively accessible with re-
spect to their non-phenomenal features. In the philoso-
phy of mind, the fundamental inaccessibility of anoth-
er person’s conscious experience has raised the ‘other
minds problem’, namely the question of how one could
ever be sure that other people are conscious beings like
oneself (see [43] for an application of this question to
neurology).
There may be good reasons to prefer an account of
behavioral or physiological markers of consciousness
to an approach to consciousness as such in cognitive
neuroscience. As stated above, conscious states can on-
ly be accessible by means of their overt ‘markers’, their
behavioral or physiological correlates. This makes con-
scious states as such methodologically unattractive for
cognitive science, to say the least. And there is yet
another obstacle. In the interpretation of neuroscien-
tific data – as well as in everyday communication –
the problem of authenticity arises: how can we be sure
that a person reports the conscious states s/he actually
‘had’? Even if the report is sincere, s/he might simply
fail correctly to remember the previous conscious states
(as is the case in epileptic seizures, where the initial oc-
currence of an aura may no longer be remembered after
secondary generalization of the seizure). Furthermore,
there is a more fundamental crux to this issue: could it
be that a person is literally mistaken about her own con-
scious states, even if memory is intact? This is the no-
torious philosophical issue of the ‘epistemic authority’
concerning conscious states, a question, which acquires
particular significance in contexts where interplay be-
tween consciousness and the unconscious is assumed –
notably in psychoanalysis, the theory which provided
the first serious attempt to explain psychogenic alter-
ations of consciousness. Confronting the inaccessibil-
ity of conscious states in cognitive neuroscience and
philosophy, even some philosophers have proposed to
handle this problem pragmatically by simply taking
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verbal reports for granted and “accept what people say
about their experiences” [10, p. 459]. In that case, how-
ever, it has to be borne in mind that explanations based
on such evidence can account for consciousness only
as far as it is reportable at all, so that it would be more
correct to take the authentic verbal report as evidence
for the “reportability” of a mental state, not as evidence
for its conscious character per se [20].
Hence, if we use overt markers of conscious states
with phenomenal features, we have to be aware that the
method of assessment constrains the features of con-
sciousness that actually become accessible. For ex-
ample, in postictal interviews we do not assess ictal
consciousness as such, but memory and reportability.
Due to these constraints, it is notoriously difficult to
disentangle a patient’s impairment in cognitive access
to or retrieval of previous ictal conscious states from
genuine impairments of ictal consciousness. Although
in principle, this problem holds both for patients with
epilepsy and patients with NEAD, there seem to be in-
teresting differences between these two groups. In re-
lation to epileptic seizures, it seems that a lack of con-
cordance between actual ictal signs of consciousness
and postictal reports is mainly due to mnestic impair-
ment. If a patient verbally reports their ongoing aura at
the beginning of a secondarily generalised seizure, and
then denies the occurrence of that aura in the post-ictal
interview, then it seems obvious that the propagated
ongoing seizure activity has somehow prevented the
formation of a stable memory “trace” of the previous
aura experience. We would not assume that the patient
erroneously reported his aura, or that he was ‘uncon-
scious’ while reporting his aura. In NEAs, on the other
hand, the pathological process of hypersynchronization
is lacking, so that we will have to recourse to other
mechanisms to explain why a patient with NEAD who
displays ictal conscious behavior will describe them-
selves as having ‘lost consciousness’ when interviewed
after the seizure. If it is not a mnestic problem, could
it be that the patient with NEAD, in contrast to the pa-
tient with epilepsy, is literally mistaken about his/her
own ictal conscious states? An answer to this question
cannot be provided by clinical observation or neurosci-
entific evidence alone. Our answer to this question will
at least partially be determined by our basic everyday
intuitions or, if we are theoretically educated, our philo-
sophically substantiated beliefs concerning conscious-
ness and the mind. Just very shortly: to answer this
question, we would have to decide not only whether
epistemic authority concerning conscious features of
mental states is necessarily to be ascribed to the subject
of these states, but also whether it makes sense at all to
supplement a real phenomenal state of a person’s mind
by an even more real phenomenal state that is some-
how inaccessible to the person. Dennett, who ridiculed
the notion of a ‘real’ phenomenality over and above
the manifestations of mental events in actions and be-
haviour altogether, took for granted that the idea of an
“objectively subjective”, that is, of a way things “actu-
ally, objectively seem to you even if they don’t seem to
seem that way to you”, would be “bizarre” [25, p. 132].
We will not try to solve this issue in the present paper
(see [41] as an attempt), but rather point to the pecu-
liar fact that according to a modern reading of psycho-
analysis [81]), the “objectively subjective” ridiculed by
Dennett is exactly what is meant by ’the unconscious’
in the psychoanalytical sense, namely the unconscious,
inaccessible psychic phenomenon that is the basic char-
acteristic of human subjectivity. The very same “ob-
jectively subjective” that strikes the analytical philoso-
pher as “bizarre” figures as the basic, unquestionable
constellation of the mind for the psychoanalyst.
4. Conclusion
What do we make of the findings of the empirical
evidence relating to NEAD in the light of these concep-
tual considerations? Phenomenal consciousness is ex-
tremely difficult to assess. If we take for granted what
people say about their ictal experiences in NEAs, it
seems that typically, phenomenal experience – and, as
a precondition for that experience, vigilance or wake-
fulness – is reduced to a lesser degree in NEAs than in
epileptic seizures involving impairment of conscious-
ness. As the study of preferred metaphoric conceptu-
alisations for seizure experiences indicates, there may
also be qualitative differences in terms of what “it feels
like to be” in a NEA rather than an epileptic seizure,
but of course, the question of a subsequent contami-
nation of these experiences by postictal mechanisms
of selective retrieval and interpretation always remains
open. Concerning the phenomenal ictal features of
consciousness, however, ‘false negatives’ concerning
phenomenal consciousness cannot be excluded on the
basis of the available evidence: patients may have ic-
tal consciousness, but may be unable to recollect their
experience afterwards, or they may even be mistaken
about their ictal “objectively subjective” experience.
Further studies that would have to compare ictal signs
of consciousness and postictal reports on an individual
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level both in NEAs and epileptic seizures might be able
to shed some light on these issues.
As for quantitative features of consciousness and
higher, action-related cognitive operations (access-
consciousness), we propose to take basic motor and
vegetative responses (motor reaction to sensory stim-
uli, pupillary reactions, and the like) as behavioral or at
least overt markers of quantitative consciousness, while
more complex behavioral phenomena like adequate
responses to linguistic stimuli, spontaneous purpose-
ful movements, or even reasonable speech production
might count as tokens of access-conscious behavior.
Although the empirical evidence is still rather weak, it
seems that there is a wide range of degrees of impair-
ment of the different aspects of consciousness. Initial
emphatic reports of “complete” loss of consciousness
by patients in clinical encounters with neurologists are
likely to be an interactional phenomenon [64]. They
often give way to more detailed accounts including rec-
ollections of what “it felt like to be” in a NEA with
careful and more persistent questioning, or can be over-
come with hypnosis if desired. Taken together, the
studies discussed above suggest that complete loss of
“consciousness” is the exception rather than the rule in
NEAs. Patients, as well as external observers,may have
a tendency to underestimate the degree of preservation
of consciousness during the seizures. The consider-
able inter- and intra-individual heterogeneity of NEA
experiences call for a more nuanced differentiation and
nosology of NEAs.
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